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COMMENTS
Joint Venture Law In the Soviet Union:
The 1920s and the 1980s*
I. INTRODUCTION
Soviet law has only permitted the establishment of joint ventures
within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during two sepa-
rate periods. Similar political and economic considerations were major
catalysts for the enactment of both joint venture laws, as well as for the
similar themes running through them, though the periods are separated
by approximately sixty-five years. Examination of both situations, in-
stead of merely the present one, not only will provide a broader perspec-
tive of how the Soviets view joint ventures themselves, but will illustrate
how Soviet legislation itself has evolved in considering free-market eco-
nomic principles.
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The passage of the March 8, 1923, concession decree established a
Chief Concessions Committee with which to negotiate and provided the
legal structure for transferring property to foreign enterprises.1 This leg-
islation opened the door to direct foreign investment in the Soviet Union
* See M. BOGUSLAVSKY & P. SMIRNOV, THE REORGANIZATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
(1989). Note, Glasnost" Joint Ventures Now Permitted in the Soviet Union, 3 FLA. INT'L L.J. 125
(1987); Recent Development, Foreign Investment: New Soviet Joint Venture Law, 28 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 473 (1987); Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law: Analysis, Issues, and Approaches for the
American Investor, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 851 (1987) for a similar discussion on the present
joint venture decree.
1 A. SIJTroN, WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1917 TO 1930
at 7 (1968). The concession decree was "replaced by the law of August 21, 1923 and amended in
December 14, 1927, and supplemented by special ordinances of May 23, 1926 and April 27, 1928."
Id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 9:633(1989)
the first successful opportunity presented to foreigners since the 1917 so-
cialist revolution.
The new Soviet policy was the product of various economic and
political conditions. By 1921, the Soviet economy had collapsed.2 The
previous socialist internal policies disrupted the pre-revolutionary struc-
ture without effectively organizing a new system to take its place. This
led to economic decline.3 This process of economic self-destruction can
be traced back to the December 21, 1917, instant demobilization decree
issued by the Soviet Commissariats of Labor and War.4 To restore the
decaying economy and to raise funds for fighting the civil war, drastic
policies, called War Communism, were adopted.5 Constant policy im-
provisation and unrealistic expectations were coupled with the dominant
administrative technique of terror to secure the obedience of the local
authorities to Moscow, provide food for the starving cities, and spur in-
dustrial production.6 As a result of these failed policies, productivity de-
clined, the market system collapsed, a goods shortage ensued, and
inflation soared.7 In response to these dire problems of internal unrest,
Lenin adopted a series of basic reforms, including scaling back nationali-
zation and reintroducing work incentives, known as the New Economic
Policy ("NEP").8 From its inception in March 1921, the NEP also per-
mitted a partial restoration of foreign enterprise within the USSR.9
Thus, the Soviet Union desired concessions as one of the remedies en-
compassed within the NEP to end its economic depression and to bring
in foreign currency and technology. Without foreign trade and expertise,
the NEP would not be able to raise Soviet productivity or restore the
2 Mckay, Foreign Enterprise in Russian and Soviet Industry: A Long Term Perspective, 48 Bus.
HIST. Rnv. 336, 350 (1974).
3 A. SurroN, supra note 1, at 311-12.
4 The edict called for a halt to all military production and stipulated a return to peace time
production within one month. While the Soviet authorities envisioned that this would end their
participation in World War I, the decree gave insufficient time to restructure the domestic economy
towards producing consumer goods. The ensuing disorganization forced skilled technicians, at least
those who were left in the country after the revolution, into the countryside and thereby deprived the
industrial structure of the "technical component" necessary to function adequately. Id.
5 These plans compounded the problem of the loss of the technocrats.
6 A. ULAM, EXPANSION AND COEXSENCE 95 (2d. ed. 1974). The results of the policy were
poor and when viewed with the attempts by some workers' committees to increase civilian output,
only disorganization and financial difficulties remained. The succeeding centralization plan only led
to confficts among makeshift managements. A. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 312.
7 A. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 312.
8 A. ULAM, supra note 6, at 126-27
9 Mckay, supra note 2, at 350. This is evidenced by Lenin's April 9th speech to a conference of
party secretaries where he stated: "We are energetically seeking the conclusion of contracts with




economy.10 The announcement of the NEP seemed to signal the return
of economic normalization to the USSR and helped change the opinions
of some United States businessmen who saw great opportunities for trade
with the Soviet Union." Financial and trade reporters encouraged in-
vestment in the Soviet Union. 2 In addition, the growing number of So-
viet trade advocates in the United States pointed to heightened European
interest in it. 3
In short, in the era immediately prior to 1923, global investors redis-
covered the Soviet Union. The convergence of international diplomacy,
economic necessity, relative internal Soviet stability, and changed im-
pressions abroad led Lenin to reemphasize foreign investment during this
period. This time, the policy would meet with relative success.14
III. THE 1923 LAW ON CONCEPTIONS
A. Conceptions of Concessions
The USSR invited foreign investment by enacting the 1923 Law on
Concessions. The Soviet definition of "concession" proved to be a broad
one. Initially there were two types of foreign participation, only one ne-
cessitating direct investment. The direct investment group was further
divided into two subordinate classifications.' 5 The first type was the pure
concession. This included a specific agreement between a foreign firm
and the Soviet government "whereby the foreign firm was enabled to de-
velop and exploit an opportunity within the USSR under the doctrine of
10 However, a potential international commercial boycott, as comprehensive as the diplomatic
isolation the Soviets were experiencing after their victory in the civil war, threatened to forestall
NEP. A. ULAM, supra note 6, at 148. The 1922 Genoa Conference of the major European powers-
"called for the purpose of reconstructing the economy of Europe, a major means for this purpose
being a reintegration of Russia into international trade"--was seen as a political coup in Moscow as
the Bolshevik government was invited to sit in on the Conference as an equal. Id. at 149. Further-
more, emanating from this Conference was the April 16, 1922, Treaty of Rapallo, signed between
Germany and the Soviet Union, which established normal and commercial relations between them.
The Treaty signalled the USSR's acceptance into the world community and also illustrated their
willingness to deal with capitalists and a market economic system. It also provided them with suffi-
cient economic strength to renationalize all internal industry and confidence to allow foreign invest-
ment within their borders. Id.
11 P. FILENE, AMERICANS AND THE SovIET EXPERimENT 1917-1933 at 112 (1967).
12 Id. Prime examples were the reporters sent to Moscow by The Magazine of Wall Street and
Railway Age.'
13 Id. As the Latvian correspondent of the American Machinist reported in 1922, unless United
States investors wanted Soviet opportunities to be totally appropriated by others, they should invest
immediately.
14 1 V. GsovsKi, SovIEr CIVIL LAW 22 n.69 (1948). The first concession decree of Nov. 23,
1920, produced no results and was deemed a failure.
15 Mckay, supra note 2, at 350-51.
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usufruct, i.e. without acquiring property rights." 6 The Soviet govern-
ment was entitled to royalty payments and the Western firm was obli-
gated to invest a stipulated sum of capital and introduce the latest
technology and equipment.17
The second type of direct investment participation was a mixed joint
stock company in which the ratio of Soviet to foreign contribution was
50:50 (later changed to 51:49, giving the Soviets a majority share), with a
Soviet citizen acting as Chairman of the Board and having the deciding
vote in resolving partnership conflicts. Profits were to be evenly di-
vided." While the Soviets provided the investment opportunity and lo-
cale, the foreigners supplied the capital and managerial skills.19
Finally, participation not requiring direct investment included tech-
nical assistance contracts, which the Soviets considered concessions even
though they were not similarly considered in the West.20 Under these
contracts, the Soviets made payments to foreign firms to acquire patents,
designs, and other technological advances. Since these arrangements did
not involve foreign capital investment in the USSR, they will not be con-
sidered in this comment.21
Due to the very diverse nature of the concessions offered, no fixed
rules were established to govern them.22 Given their individualistic na-
ture, concessions were exempted from the Soviet legal order, and there-
fore, they generally contained deviations from the enacted legislation
governing economic relations.2 3 These deviations were tolerated by the
Soviet government because the concession contract had the force and
character of law.24 Nevertheless, concessions had to operate within the
Soviet centralized system. 5 The digressions from statutory norms were
16 A. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 8.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Mckay, supra note 2, at 351.
20 A. SuTTON, supra note 1, at 8-9.
21 See ag., Naleszkiewicz, Technical Assistance of the American Enterprises to the Growth of the
Soviet Union, 1929-1933, 25 RUSSIAN REV. 54 (1966). The 1929 contract between Ford Motor
Corporation and the Supreme Council of National Economy (V.S.N.H.) of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic is a prime example of such an agreement.
22 Freund, Economic Organization, Commercial Regulations and Concessions in the Soviet
Union, 22 ILL. L. REv. 852, 877 (1928).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. McKay, supra note 2, at 350. See 2 V. GSOVSKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW (1948) at 68. Soviet
jurists exempted concessions from the domestic legal order as follows:
For use a concession is a contract of the [S]oviet government with its class enemy-a foreign
capitalist-made for the purpose of restoring the productive forces of the country. From the
legal point of view, a concession implies an element of exemption from the general regime estab-
lished by law. A concessionaire is granted rights with regard to the exploitation of the object of
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an attempt to encourage Western businessmen into investing in the So-
viet Union. While certain inducements were offered, the other basic
theme that can be discerned in concession agreements is one of upholding
and strengthening the Soviet centralized system.
The Soviet government always made certain that the concessions it
granted would fit in properly with the general economic plan.2 6 The pur-
pose of the concessions apparently was not merely to attract foreign in-
vestment, but to attract external capital and resources to build up those
industries needed for the domestic economy or those areas slated for an
increase in export potential. By maintaining centralized planning and
coordination over the granting of concessions, the Soviet economic plan-
ners could examine the risk of exposure and foreign dependence to which
they were subjected by each joint enterprise.
B. Provisions of Concessions
Concession agreements gave the concessionaire the right of in-
dependent management in administrative, financial and technical rela-
tions.27 The state thus accorded a certain amount of independence to the
firm. However, the concessionaire was required to submit a minutely
drafted production program to the state which would specify a defined
annual quantity of production and sometimes went as far as attempting
to provide a schedule for the entire period of the concession.2" Failure to
abide by the plan as fixed in the agreement, for production of output or
for usage of the required amount of domestically produced inputs, could
lead to the annulment of the contract with the concession being taken
back with no indemnification.29 Though the state realized that the con-
cessionaire would not be willing to give up all control over productions
decisions, and would not reduce production voluntarily, it also noted
that a production program would be most desirable given the needs and
structure of a planned economy.3" Thus, the apparent grant of indepen-
dence, and its limitation by a state-imposed program, illustrates the
themes of economic expediency and a desire to appease Western inves-
tors versus the overriding Soviet goal of centralized planning.
concession (in industries, concessions with regard to the industrial enterprise) which under gen-
eral law are not granted to private business.
26 Freund, supra note 22, at 879.
27 1. BERNSHrIN, OCHERK KoNTsEssioNNOGo PRAVA SSSR 37 (1929).
28 The required production level was determined initially by contract provisions and, in later
years of production, by market conditions, technological progress, and manufacturing capabilities.
Id See M. HWANG JEN, LE REGIME DES CONCESSIONS EN RussIE SOVIETIQUE 43 (1929).
29 A. KRIMMER, supra note 9, at 406. Alternatively, the government could demand additional
rent payments as a penalty.
30 1. BERNSHTEIN, supra note 27, at 37.
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A dire need for foreign investment was revealed in the stringent cap-
ital provisions. The concessionaire was obligated to import a minimum
amount of foreign currency which was exchanged for Soviet currency
through the State Bank.31 In addition, operating capital was to be de-
rived from abroad and not from sources within the USSR, and had to be
fully amortized during the life of the concession.32 Thus, to improve its
financial position, the USSR required the enterprise to draw on foreign
capital and use it fully during the term of operations, and prohibited it
from using Soviet resources. 33 Though the foreign partner usually pro-
vided the funds, and the Soviets, the business opportunity, the Soviet
government occasionally participated in capital formation to encourage
concessions, though usually using domestic currency to avoid draining
foreign reserves.34 Nevertheless, the Soviets were guaranteed a percent-
age of the stock of the firm regardless of their capital contribution.35 The
competing themes are again visible. Though capital conditions were
strict, the mere fact that foreign businessmen were allowed to carry on
activities in the USSR, which was otherwise forbidden, was by itself seen
as a large grant. 36 However, this was balanced by guaranteed Soviet par-
ticipation in profits having no relation to the capital contribution of the
State.
The issue of property rights again echoes the dueling themes of fi-
nancial attraction and concessionaire independence versus socialist legal
precepts. Since land, forests, and water rights could not be privately
owned, they were given to the concessionaire on a use-only basis. 37 The
concessionaire did not have "complete ownership of the factories and
buildings, but merely a so-called concession ownership which, however,
exclude[d] the right of free disposal and mortgage. ' '38  Control over
alienation, supplemented by a condition which forbade the concession-
aire from assigning his property rights, remained vested in the state.39
Furthermore, the concessionaire had the duty to install all necessary util-
ities and infrastructure.' ° Finally, the Soviets retained the right to collect
31 Id. at 38; see also M. HWANG JEN, supra 28, at 39.
32 Liubimov, The Soviets and Foreign Concession, 9 FOREIGN Arr. 95, 102 (Oct. 1930).
33 Id. at 96, 102.
34 A. KRIMMER, supra note 9, at 401. For example, the Soviets contributed 50% of the social
capital to the Otto Wolff concession. Id.
35 Id. at n.1. The Soviets justified this pursuant to the May 22, 1922, statute ratified by the
Council of People's Commissars.
36 Freund, supra note 22, at 877.
37 Id. at 878.
38 Id.
39 A. KRIMMER, supra note 9, at 401.
40 JEN, supra note 28, at 43.
Soviet Joint Ventures
9:633(1989)
rent on property, collect insurance benefits on policies paid for by the
concessionaire, and regain possession of the buildings and other struc-
tures without paying any compensation. This was especially significant
since the concessionaire was required to employ all possible technological
improvements.41 While the concessionaire was given production and
property rights not given to the ordinary Soviet citizen or other legal
entities, these privileges were given only to ensure the most efficient oper-
ation of the firm. This guaranteed that the benefits of production, which
the Soviets had already slated into their national economic plan, would
accrue quickly. Most risk of loss was placed on the foreign partner with
financial and technical rewards inuring to the State at the end of the
concession.
Concession enterprises had to contend with the state monopoly of
foreign trade. However, to facilitate the introduction of new machinery
into the Soviet Union, the concessionaire's equipment could be imported
duty-free for a limited period--e.g., the Harriman manganese concession,
one of the largest investment opportunities offered, received this privilege
for four years.4 2 Similarly, concessionaires were permitted to circumvent
the state system to import raw materials and semi-manufactured goods if
they were unavailable on the Soviet market.43 Furthermore, export-
oriented concessions achieved additional exceptions to the trade regime.
They were, for example, given greater freedom to sell their product
abroad instead of directing their trade to Soviet state organs and
industries.'
Concessions that directed their production toward internal trade
with Soviet industry were by and large subject to the same foreign trade
barriers as Soviet citizens."5 The Soviets gave more leeway to export-
oriented firms because those enterprises earned hard currency. Appar-
ently, the Soviets were more willing to ease their centralized trade struc-
ture, and ignore their stated legislation, when hard currency was being
brought into the nation. However, by bifurcating concessions into those
providing exports and helping their balance of trade and those devoted to
clearly subordinate domestic needs, the Soviets were able to apply two
sets of rules. This made it easier to achieve their goals of earning hard
currency revenues and maintaining as great a degree of control over as
many aspects of production as possible.
41 Id. See also A. KRIMMER, supra note 9, at 401.
42 1. BERNSHTEIN, supra note 27, at 42.
43 Liubinov, supra note 32, at 97.
44 I. BERNSHTEIN, supra note 27, at 40-41.
45 Id. at 42.
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C. Taxation Aspects
Provisions in the concession agreements covering taxation were not
uniform.4 6 Most accords required only that social security charges be
paid.47 However, the concessionaire was sometime given the special
right to pay a specified sum, in lieu of taxes, which would cover all its
annual fiscal obligations.4 8
The tax rate for the profits agreed to in the concession contract va-
ried from 15 to 25% depending upon the amount of imported capital
involved.49 The tax burden became more onerous when the concession
earned excess profits, which were defined as those profits exceeding the
amount provided for in the initial agreement." Such profits were divided
between the concessionaire and the Soviet government on an agreed-
upon schedule. The Soviet's share increased as the excess profits grew,
often exceeding 65%. 51 Therefore, there was a dual tax system, moder-
ate as long as prearranged guidelines were followed, and severe if the
Soviets deemed profits exorbitant. This illustrates the desire not to im-
pose an unreasonable fiscal burden on the foreign investor, while main-
taining control over the entire price structure in the economy. 2 Control
over price through the excess profits tax was an important consideration
in concession agreements. 3
D. Other Considerations
In addition to the factors discussed above, the Soviet Union used
several other devices to attract foreign capital. One example was labor
policy. Though concessionaires in principle had to follow Soviet labor
legislation strictly and hire mostly Soviet personnel, exceptions were
granted.54 To facilitate production, some companies were permitted to
hire a certain percentage of foreign specialists and workers despite the
existing legislation.55 Soviet legal commentators recognized these excep-
46 Liubimov, supra note 32, at 98.
47 A. KRIMMER, supra note 9, at 410. However, the Harriman concession did pay additional
expenses related to postage, legal, and license taxes. id.





53 See I. BERNSHTEIN, supra note 27, at 40. Bernshtein discusses price considerations at length
in his "Sale of Product" section. Krimmer gives the Otto Wolff concession as an example of a
concession which agreed to adhere to the price set by the state. A. KRIMMER, supra note 9, at 407.
54 See generally M. DEWAR, LABOUR POLICY IN THE USSR 1917-1928 (1956); G. PRICE, LA-
BOR PROTECTION IN SOVIET RUSSIA (1928).
55 PRICE, supra note 54.
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tions but stated that the concession agreements permitted only 15 to 20%
of the firm's work force to be foreign.16 However, the Lena Goldfields
concession, arguably the largest and most important one granted, was
allowed to bring up to 50% of its skilled workers and 15% of its un-
skilled labor from abroad." More dramatically, the Harriman conces-
sion was allowed to circumvent the requirement of dealing through a
trade union and, after a 1927 strike, to gain control over its employment
until its liquidation.58 Though the Soviets viewed the concession as a
useful employment-creating device, they recognized the need to bring in
specialists from other countries to facilitate production and to teach So-
viet workers new techniques. The official pronouncements and the indi-
vidual concession agreements again show the collision of economic
necessity and early socialist theory.
The Soviet government also created a special form of dispute resolu-
tion for concessionaires. Ad hoc arbitration commissions rather than of-
ficial state courts were used for dispute resolution. 9 Settlement of
disagreements could be tailored to each enterprise, since the parties could
pick arbitrators familiar with the firm, its operations, and its contract
with the Soviet state. Furthermore, beginning in 1925, concessionaires
gained the right to name foreign arbitrators if so stipulated in the original
agreement." These provisions eased foreigners' fears about being sub-
jected to a new and unfamiliar court system and gave them a more active
role in the process by allowing them to participate in arbiter selection.
Further easing foreigners' suspicions was that the USSR guaranteed
that the properties of the enterprise would not be subjected to nationali-
zation, requisition, or confiscation."1 Protection of property was impor-
tant to concessionaires, but safeguarding its value was also in the Soviet
government's interest as the firm reverted to the state at the end of the
concession period, with no renumeration for the enterprise, concurrent
with payments that had been deducted by the firm for depreciation.62
IV. THE END OF CONCESSIONS
Despite taking these elaborate contract measures, by 1932 the pe-
riod to negotiate concessions had closed.6" According to both Marxist
56 Liubimov, supra note 32, at 103.
57 A. KRIMMER, supra note 9, at 409.
58 Id. at 410.
59 Id. at 412.
60 Id.
61 S. BRON, SoVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS 139 (1930).
62 A. KRIMMER, supra note 9, at 414.
63 V. GsovsKI, supra note 25, at 68.
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and non-Marxist writers, concessions were regarded as a negligible factor
in early Soviet economic development.' There have been many sugges-
tions about why the policy failed, including prohibitive currency provi-
sions and the inefficiency of the concession as a vehicle for currency and
technology transfer.6 5 Other possibilities are the international effects of
the Great Depression and the subsequent collapse of international trade
and currency movements.66 Similarly, Stalin's consolidation of power,
and the ensuing purges and policy of autarky, should not be ignored.6 7
The concession policy was viewed as an experiment in the interna-
tional arena and apparently was used by the Soviets-not as a long-term
policy, but as a gap-filling measure intended to insure the success of the
new Soviet state by enlarging its capital flows. Soviet legislation was not
amended to deal with the concessions; rather, it viewed them as a tempo-
rary anomaly.
V. THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION
Reconstructing the Soviet economy to achieve greater efficiency in
production, to introduce new management strategies, and to increase the
quality, quantity, and variety of offered goods has been Mikhail
Gorbachev's main domestic policy objective.6' The quality of industrial
and consumer goods is not merely an internal problem but is also an
issue in foreign trade. The USSR relies heavily on imports to obtain the
high technology it is unable to produce domestically.6 9 In an effort to
obtain this modern equipment, improve its domestic economy, and make
its exports more competitive on the world market, the Soviet Union re-
cently passed legislation allowing joint ventures and direct foreign invest-
ment in the Soviet Union.70
The desire to diversify exports stems from the Soviet Union's need
for additional sources of hard currency. Traditionally, the USSR has
relied on exporting raw materials to obtain currency, but recent events
have proven this to be inefficient. For example, until recently the USSR
obtained two-thirds of its foreign currency from oil exports.71 The de-
64 A. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 11.
65 Id. at 10-11.
66 See Naleszkiewicz, supra note 21, at 72-73.
67 Id.
68 See M. GOLDMAN, GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE (1987); N.Y. Times, July 19, 1987 (Maga-
zine) at 28; Report by M.S. Gorbachev General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
of the Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee on June 15, 1987, 39 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET
PRESS, July 28, 1987, at 3.
69 See M. GOLDMAN, supra note 68, at 118-47.
70 Pravda, Jan. 27, 1987, at 1, col. I (Eng. ed.) [hereinafter Pravda].
71 Venturing Jointly into the Russian Unknown, ECONOMIST, June 6-12, 1987, at 67.
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cline in oil prices, the diminishing Soviet oil supplies, and the fact that
newer supplies are located in the remote, infrastructure-poor areas of Si-
beria72 have forced Soviet policymakers to try to increase the small share
of manufactured goods in their hard currency exports.7 3
VI. HISTORIC SIMILARITY OF THE NEP AND Perestroika
The economic liberalization, perestroika, presently occurring in the
Soviet Union is strikingly similar to the policies of the New Economic
Policy of the 1920s. Both encouraged decentralization, opened the
USSR to greater market influences, and are the only two periods in So-
viet history in which direct foreign investment in the USSR was
permitted.7 4
The similarities do not end with economic considerations. As with
the USSR's reentry into the European-sponsored (free-market) economic
community at Genoa in 1922, so today the Soviet Union has shown a
greater willingness to cooperate with global market forces.7 5 It has al-
lowed its socialist allies to deal with West European created economic
communities and has softened its own view toward the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). 76 Greater trust toward Western
market forces has thus been building over the past few years.
Similar economic needs and political considerations have preceded
the introduction of legislation allowing direct foreign investment in the
Soviet Union. In drafting the concession contracts of the 1920s and the
present statute, the Soviet Union has sought to address analogous situa-
72 Id.
73 Currently, the Soviet Union earns less than 4% of their hard currency through the export of
manufactured goods. Id.
74 See A. NoVE, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE USSR (1987); Individual Enterprise: Opportu-
nities and Obligations, 39 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, June 3, 1987, at 7 [hereinafter Individual
Enterprise]; In the USSR Council of Ministers, 39 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, Mar. 11, 1987, at
15; So That Everyone Will Benefit, 39 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, Apr. 29, 1987, at 15 [hereinaf-
ter Everyone Will Benefit]. The NEP rescinded state ownership of all industries except those at the
"commanding heights" of the economy; A ULAM, supra note 6, at 127; and perestroika has given
individuals the right to go into business to manufacture certain types of consumer goods and per-
form certain specialized services. Individual Enterprise, supra, Council of Ministers, supra. Under-
scoring this historical parallel, V.M. Kamentsev, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers,
has noted that the present joint venture program is "consistent" with the concept of the commercial
concessions of the 1920s. Everyone Will Benefit, supra.
75 N.Y. Times, July 19, 1987, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
76 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]; Kennedy, The Accession of the Soviet Union
to GATT21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 23 (1987). The Soviets have applied for permission to participate
in the latest round ofinternational trade negotiations known as the Uruguay Round. Their member-
ship was denied, largely due to reaction from the United States. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1988, § 4, at 2,
col. 3.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 9:633(1989)
tions, and it is likely that the same themes that ran through the conces-
sion agreements will run through the 1987 "proposed" law. Since "[t]he
stipulations of the concession agreement[s] were interpreted very
strictly,"" and many provisions were problematic to foreign concerns, it
would be useful to analyze the current legislation to identify ambiguities
that could lead to contract failure with undesirable results for the foreign
investor and, ultimately, the Soviet Union.
Two documents--entitled "On Questions Concerning the Establish-
ment in the Territory of the USSR and Operation of Joint Ventures, In-
ternational Amalgamations and Organizations with the Participation of
Soviet and Foreign Organizations, Firms and Management Bodies" and
"On the Establishment in the Territory of the USSR and Operation of
Joint Ventures with the Participation of Soviet Organizations and Firms
from Capitalist and Developing Countries"-have put forth the legal
framework for foreign joint ventures in the Soviet Union.78 While these
guidelines are not formal law in the Western sense, nonetheless they have
been extensively cited and referred to in the Soviet press.79 These general
edicts include elements of a Soviet pragmatic approach to trade with cap-
italist societies along with traditional socialist themes and goals. Thus, in
examining them, special attention should be given to underlying Soviet
policies and areas of concern for the foreign participant.
VII. THE NEW SOVIET JOINT VENTURE GUIDELINES
A. The Edict's Introductory Remarks
Joint enterprises are to be designed to "more fully satisfy the coun-
try's demand for certain types of industrial goods. .. to bring advance
foreign equipment and methods . . . and financial resources into the
USSR economy, to develop the country's export base and to reduce inef-
ficient imports."8 0 From the introduction of the guidelines it is apparent
that perhaps the greatest hurdle the future partners will have to over-
come is that of divergent expectations. While capitalist firms no doubt
seek access to the large, untapped Soviet market, the Soviets have articu-
lated that their primary focus will be export diversification and the at-
traction of foreign capital and technology. In short, while Western firms
seek to tie the USSR to the global system of exchange of goods and serv-
ices, the Soviets view joint ventures as a means of ensuring more rapid
77 Freund, supra note 22, at 877.
78 Pravda, supra note 70; Legal Times, Mar. 2, 1987, at 12, col. 1.
79 Legal Times, supra note 78; NEw TIMEs, Dec. 22, 1986, at 15; NEw TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1987, at
16.
80 1987 FOREIGN TRADE No. 5 (supplement) at 16 (Eng. ed.).
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modernization and perhaps more stable self-sufficiency. It is against this
background that the major provisions of the guidelines must be consid-
ered. Pragmatic considerations are included to attract Western invest-
ment, while other clauses are designed to uphold and strengthen the
Soviet system.
B. Legal Status of Joint Ventures
The guidelines consider joint ventures to be legal entities under So-
viet law. They can sue and be sued, acquire property fights, and enter
contractual arrangements."1 The Soviet state and partners in the joint
enterprise are not accountable for the obligations of these organiza-
tions. 2 Conversely, the joint venture is not responsible for the obliga-
tions of the Soviet party. The enterprise operates as an independent
economic entity and is completely self-financing.8 3
C. Capital Formation and Valuation of Inputs
Funding the operations of the joint enterprise is then left to the part-
ners alone-both Soviet and foreign. This is achieved by establishing a
capital fund, the size of which is stated in the required state charter. 84
Contributions to the fund are not limited to currency alone and may
include buildings, equipment, facilities, and other material assets as well
as the rights to use land, water, and other natural resources and property
rights (including inventions and technology).85 These contributions are
to be converted into rubles according to the rate set by the USSR State
Bank and valued against world market prices for non-currency inputs, or
set by agreement of the parties.
There are a number of valuation problems implicit in this financing
section of the legal outline. Given that the joint enterprise is in Soviet
territory, the Soviet partner will probably contribute mineral and prop-
erty rights, while the Western party will probably contribute either cur-
rency or intellectual property. Often, neither party agreement nor world
market prices are adequate mechanisms to value a plot of unique land in
the Soviet Union. Foreign investors in East European joint ventures
have noted a tendency to overvalue the real estate contributed by domes-
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no reason to expect the situation in the Soviet Union will be different.
Water and mineral rights may be susceptible to the same type of overval-
uation because it is the domestic party, as in the real property context,
who may argue about their unique qualities.
Perhaps most troublesome is the contribution of intellectual prop-
erty where no standard for price analysis may exist. While there is a
growing amount of trade involving intellectual property, there is inade-
quate protection of this key trade component.87 Should the invention be
valued on the basis of the amount of time and resources necessary to
duplicate the effort in the non-contributing partner's economy? If high
technology is involved, no price may be adequate, as no replication effort
in the non-donating partner's economy is possible. Furthermore, if non-
identical substitutes exist in the two countries, should their value be used
as a basis of comparison? The Soviets have stated that party agreement is
one method of evaluating inputs. The East Europeans (who have already
been experimenting with joint ventures and whose socialist method of
production provides for a useful analogy to the Soviet experiment)
advocate either establishing strict evaluative criteria, basing valuation on
the international market standard, or having standards established by an
expert outsider. However, these methods have been deemed
unsatisfactory. 8
Establishing meaningful criteria may lead to extensive and hotly
contested negotiating and may destroy the joint venture agreement. The
international market may be unable to value technology precisely. The
accuracy of an outside expert's valuation will depend on the accuracy of
the ruble-dollar exchange rate, since the valuation will most likely be
based on the prices of the "good's" country of origin.89 Lastly, the USSR
has not enacted other legislation, such as new patent and copyright laws,
illustrating that it may be unaware of or unconcerned about such
difficulties.90
87 Dam, The Growing Importance of International Protection of Intellectual Property, 21 INT'L
LAW. 627 (Summer 1987).
88 Buzescu, supra note 86, at 423-24.
89 Id. at 424.
90 Dam, supra note 87, at 635. For example, in response to similar problems, China has recently
enacted a new patent law. Regulations for the Implementation of the Patent Law of the PRC (Regu-
lation 850119), reprinted in in STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (1987). See also Chang, New Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, 25 PAT. L. ANN.
3-1, 3-29 (1988). A new copyright law is also being considered. The Chinese government estab-
lished a State Copyright Bureau in 1985, and said it would be "not long" before a copyright law
would be formulated. Shoukang, Some Opinions on Copyright in the People's Republic of China, 1 J.
OF CHINESE L. 63, (1987).
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D. Property Rights, Insurance, and Assignment
Property rights sections of the guidelines echo the themes of at-
tracting foreign capital and maintaining control over the economy. The
property of the joint venture is protected in accordance with Soviet law,
though additional assurance is given to the foreign partner that the assets
of the enterprise are not subject to administrative requisition or confisca-
tion.91 This reflects the Soviet desire to placate fears of nationalization.
Insurance and assignment aspects reflect a more traditional Soviet desire
to keep the joint venture integrated with the USSR's economic system.
The assets of the joint enterprise must be insured by USSR insurance
organizations. 92 This serves two purposes. It enables the Soviets to earn
additional hard currency by promoting joint ventures, and it provides
additional liquidity in the internal Soviet insurance market.
Further tying the firm to the Soviet economy are the transfer rights
of the partners.93 Though each partner has the right to transfer all or
part of his share to a third party upon mutual agreement, transfer can
occur only with the permission of the state foreign commission of the
USSR Council of Ministers-the highest state institution. Even after ap-
proval is obtained, the Soviet partner or partners have a preferential right
to acquire the shares of the foreign participant. 94 The Soviet government
thus has a preemptive right to approve and monitor new foreign inves-
tors or totally internalize the firm's operations. This is clearly a risk-
management provision, as the Soviets desire to maintain as much super-
vision over the enterprise as possible.
E. Management
The original decree insuring the USSR's control of the firm is the
provision that the Soviet side have a 51% share of the joint venture for
the Soviet participant.95 Recently, however, the restriction limiting for-
eign partners' contribution to 49% has been lifted by changes decreed in
the joint venture law by the Council of Ministers. Presently, the two
partners may decide on the level of participation between themselves.96
The present move toward flexibility is not only limited to a foreign part-
ner's participation level, but is noted in other sections of the legislation.




95 Id. at 16.
96 A Toast-orRoast-forReform?, TIME, Nov. 7, 1988, at 40; Chicago Tribune, Nov. 15, 1988,
§ 3, at 6, col. 5; Russia's Hard Sell, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 1988-Jan. 6, 1989, at 81; XVII Bus.
E. EUR., Dec. 19, 1988, at 403.
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As part of an overall restructuring of the economy and a move toward a
more open society, the Soviet Union amended the guidelines to allow
greater foreign participation in the economy, especially if economic effi-
ciency results.
This new flexibility is further illustrated in the rules of management.
Originally, although the administrative board, the governing body of the
enterprise, was to consist of citizens of both participating countries, the
chairman of the administrative board and the general director of the as-
sociation were required to be citizens of the Soviet Union.97 Since the
board makes policy for the firm, the Western partner's role was not ade-
quately safeguarded, as the Soviets provided for supervisory power in
both management structures of the enterprise. Policy and daily business
decisions might have reflected a Soviet bias, given the heads of manage-
ment were Soviet nationals. When coupled with the original requirement
that the Soviet partner maintain a 51% share in the operation, the West-
ern partner was clearly a junior participant.98
A recent amendment to the initial joint venture rules has improved
the situation for Western investors. Where originally the control of the
venture was to remain firmly in Soviet hands, now a foreigner may be-
come the manager of the enterprise.99 A Western partner may negotiate
for a majority share of the enterprise, and may place a Western manager
into the firm's administration. Together, this would make the operation
a foreign-controlled entity. This is something the Soviet authorities may
not have envisioned when they altered specific provisions of the original
decree. Nevertheless, the Soviet authorities not only make specific con-
cessions when they change a joint venture provision, but in fact seem to
alter the entire joint venture regime. However, as one Western negotia-
tor noted, even Soviet partners have never seen a complete copy of the
relevant legislation." ° Therefore, it is difficult to establish exactly where
a "manager" fits into the administrative ladder of the joint venture, given
that the original legislation provides only for a chairman and a general
director.
F. Trade Matters
The competing themes of enterprise independence and Soviet con-
97 The members of the administrative board are appointed by both the partners and the director-
ate. The directorate is the organ supervising the day-to-day functions of the firm and appointed by
the board. XVII Bus. E. EVR., supra note 96, at 17.
98 See text accompanying note 95.
99 XVII Bus. E. EUR., supra note 96, at 403.
100 XVII Bus. E. EUR., Aug. 15, 1988, at 257.
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trol are apparent in the foreign trade field. A joint enterprise has the
right independently to export and import items necessary for its "man-
agement operations." ' This is a concession by the Soviets, as Soviet
firms must ordinarily operate through the Soviet bureaucracy to have
access to the world market.102 However, this concession is limited be-
cause the proposed legislation provides that "import and export of goods
and other assets of the joint enterprise is done on the basis of permission
granted according to procedures established by USSR law."10 3 The defi-
nition of "management operations" is not covered in the text. Therefore,
it is difficult to determine when external trade is handled directly by the
enterprise or through the state. No doubt each partner will have a differ-
ent notion of how much trade independence actually exists since each
will view "management operations" differently. The Soviet partner may
have a vested interest in state controlled trade while the Western entre-
preneur will strive for as much trade discretion as possible.
G. Supply and Transportation
Deliveries to the joint venture of "equipment, raw and other materi-
als, components, fuel, energy and other produce shall be affected through
Soviet trade organizations."1 4 The delivery system upon which the
trade organizations rest is fraught with delays, and merchandise is often
of poor quality when delivered.105 It will be difficult for a Western profit-
seeking firm to adapt to this system given its different business norms and
the assumption that the quality of inputs will be at world standards.
Furthermore, the guidelines provide that these joint ventures have a pri-
ority in the distribution network. 106 Since the joint enterprises are not
part of the national economic plan, as USSR state agencies do not give
them obligatory planned quotas, how the supply system will handle or-
ders placed by these new creations remains unexplained. Finally, ship-
ments produced by the joint association are to be completed by the
already overburdened Soviet transportation system. 107
101 Pravda, Jan. 27, 1987, at 2, col. 7 (Eng. ed.).
102 Hewett, Foreign Economic Relations, in THE SOVIET ECONOMY: TOWARD THE YEAR 2000 at
269 (A. Bergson & H. Levine eds. 1983). Access to world markets is granted through the ministry,
under which the joint ventures operate, and the ministry's foreign trade organization, which studies
foreign markets and evaluates the firm's trade request.
103 Pravda, supra note 101, at 2 col. 7.
104 FOREIGN TRADE, supra note 80, at 17.
105 Reforming the Soviet Economy, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 7, 1987, at 76, 78.
106 Pravda, supra note 70, at 2, col. 3.
107 See SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN TRANSPORT PROBLEMS (J. Ambler Denis, J. Shaw & L.
Symons eds. 1985); H. HUNTER, SOVIET TRANSPORT EXPERIENCE: ITS LESSONS FOR OTHER
CourRIES (1968).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 9:633(1989)
H. Profits and Financial Affairs
Matters relating directly to profits, interest, and accounting most
vividly demonstrate the divergent expectations of the parties. Profits are
taxed at the rate of 30%.108 Soviet law also provides that a reserve fund
shall be set up with deductions from profits.109 The fund continues to
grow until it reaches an amount equal to 25% of the enterprise's capital
fund. The required amount of annual payments is to be set out in the
charter. 110 Presumably, losses incurred will be deducted from the fund.
The deductions are an important consideration when determining net in-
come to tax since the guidelines do not state whether the firm's receipts
will be taxed before or after the money is set aside, and this ultimately
affects the amount of tax that will be paid.
A joint venture's assets are either put into a ruble or foreign cur-
rency account in the USSR State Bank or the USSR Foreign Trade
Bank.111 While the legislation appears to be specific as to interest rate
provisions, closer examination shows that it is incomplete. Interest on
foreign currency accounts will be paid according to the exchange rate on
the world market and on ruble accounts according to USSR State Bank
guidelines.112 It seems that the Soviets are setting interest on a fixed
schedule as they set the exchange rate to the ruble. As for ruble ac-
counts, interest payments would be lower than a Western partner nor-
mally receives. Thus, the enterprise will not earn rates commensurate
with Western banks, which may affect their profitability.
Foreign partners are explicitly guaranteed that their share of the
profits will be converted into foreign currency at the border.11 This
clause attempts to assure foreign participants that the Soviet government
will not circumvent its promise not to requisition investments. However,
the overriding need by the Soviets for foreign currency again is evident in
the provision which subjects most repatriated profits to an additional
20% tax.'14 It seems that a penalty is being levied against the foreign
partner and this provision gives incentive to reinvest profits back in the
Soviet Union-clearly in line with the introduction of the legislation "to
develop the country's export base and economy." '115
While the Soviet government is using tax policy to prevent repatria-
108 FOREIGN TRADE, supra note 80, at 18.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Pravda, supra note 101, at 2 col. 8.
112 Id.
113 Pravda, Jan. 27, 1987, at 2, col. 1 (Eng. ed.).
114 FOREIGN TRADE, supra note 80, at 17.
115 Id. at 16.
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tion of profits, it is also using tax incentives to encourage the initial West-
ern investment. These incentives, having recently been amended,
however, once again show that pragmatic concerns are being strength-
ened within the legislation on a piecemeal basis. When coupled with the
other alterations in the decree, it appears that the original joint venture
regime is being changed. Joint enterprises were exempt from taxes on
their profits for the first two years of operation. Furthermore, the USSR
Ministry of Finance could, at its discretion, reduce the tax rate or com-
pletely exempt individual payers from taxation in subsequent years." 6
While encouraging on their face, these initial provisions did not compare
favorably with other centrally planned economies offering joint venture
opportunities. For example, China grants tax holidays for two years
starting with the initial profit-making year (which may not be the same
as the first year of production), followed by a 50% cut for the next three
years.117 However, the East European states have had tax rates commen-
surate with the Soviet Union's original rules.118 China has recognized
that the joint ventures in Eastern Europe have met with limited success
and that tax incentives may be a way to stimulate Western interest and
investment. 119
Perhaps in response to the difficulties encountered by the East Euro-
pean experience and China's relative success, the October amendments in
the USSR's legislation now permit the two-year tax holiday to begin
from the time the joint venture shows a profit.12 Additionally, joint ven-
tures located in the Soviet Far East receive even more favorable treat-
ment. Taxes are waived for the first three years after profits are achieved,
and the Ministry of Finance is instructed to reduce the tax level to 10%
once the initial grace period has expired.121
I. Other Considerations
The original guidelines provided that Soviet citizens are to comprise
the bulk of personnel of a joint venture.' 22 In addition, the joint venture
must pay state budget deductions for state social insurance for Soviet as
116 Pravda, supra note 113.
117 Legal Times, supra note 78, at 13 col.2.
118 Buzescu, supra note 86, at 432. Romania has a tax rate of 30 percent computed on the joint
venture's profits before distribution. In Hungary there is a 40 percent tax on profit minus amounts
paid for risk and incentive funds--but if the profits are reinvested within the country, the Ministry of
Finance may approve partial disbursements.
119 Id. at 442.
120 Note, supra note *, at 142.
121 XVII Bus. E. EUR. supra note 96, at 403.
122 FOREIGN TRADE, supra note 80, at 17.
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well as foreign workers.123 Soviet citizens will probably be the only bene-
ficiaries of state social insurance, and no provision is made for repayment
of these deductions should foreign workers not use them. Last, while the
Soviet system benefits from new methods of production and worker
training-at least worker training under a profit maximizing firm-the
enterprise is required to reach agreement with a Soviet trade union. The
union could prove to be difficult to contend with, since it will apply So-
viet legislation-except for salary, holiday, and pension matters-to all
workers, regardless of citizenry.124 Liberalizing amendments to the joint
venture regime have again been implemented. The joint venture is no
longer obligated to consult with the trade union in matters of hiring,
firing, and ruble incentive payments for local workers.'25 The implicit
theme of attracting foreign capital appears to have gained strength.
The edict implies that joint enterprise partners are encouraged to
solve disputes between themselves, and explicit mention of dispute pro-
ceedings is made in the edict. Any dispute involving the enterprise's op-
erations is to be examined "according to the legislation of the USSR
either by USSR courts or by common consent of both sides, by an arbi-
tration tribunal." '26 Soviet law naturally embodies socialist principles,
including socialist economic principles and the state ownership of pro-
duction, and therefore is ill-suited for foreign partners whose frame of
reference is free-market economics. For example, the price of deliveries
of production materials from Soviet industries must be set with reference
to world market prices, yet this may prove problematic given Soviet price
theory. 127
Finally, procedures for liquidation are to be outlined in the charter
documents.1 28 Most problematic of any provision, though, is that the
USSR Council of Ministers can force liquidation if the joint venture's
operations are not in accord with the goals of the charter documents, 129
in effect granting the state with the ultimate power of determining
whether, on the basis of subjective considerations, the joint enterprise
will continue to function. A partner is entitled to a return of its contribu-
tion for the remaining value at the time of liquidation.13 0 This could
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 XVII Bus. E. EUR. supra note 96, at 403.
126 Id. at 17.
127 See id. Soviet price theory does not account for opportunity cost and marketing clearing crite-
ria. Kaser, Economic Policy in SOVIET POLICY, FOR THE 1980s at 196 (A. Brown & M. Kaser eds.
1982).





encourage strategic behavior by the state should it be able to gain a wind-
fall by the liquidation of a firm when, for example, the value of the enter-
prise will rise shortly after its operations are terminated-though given
political and long-term economic pressures this is highly unlikely.
VIII. COMPARISON OF THE 1920S AND THE 1980s
Both the 1920s concession agreements and the current law reveal
the same concerns of attracting foreign exchange and encouraging eco-
nomic development while upholding socialist principles of centralization.
Both the 1920s ad hoc principles and the current guidelines attempt to
balance these concerns, although they often collide.
There are many similarities between the 1920s joint venture rules
and the 1980s guidelines. The 1980s guidelines continue to incorporate
not only the inducements proffered in the earlier period, but, more no-
ticeably, the continuing (albeit reduced) desire to tie the joint venture to
the Soviet centralized structure. Inducements were used to encourage
entrepreneurial investment. Limited exceptions to the state monopoliza-
tion of foreign trade have been offered under both regimes. Under the
concession contracts, export-oriented concessions were permitted freer
access to foreign purchasers, while the present guidelines allow circum-
vention of the system for imports related to the management operations
of the firm.'31 Similarly, customs duties-for imports of equipment and
materials used by the foreign partner as contribution to the joint ven-
ture's authorized fund-were forgiven in both periods. 32 Last, ad hoc
arbitration of disputes was encouraged, allowing circumvention of the
state court system.
Other similarities reflect the continuing Soviet theme of tying these
enterprises to the state economic system. Management bodies of joint
ventures, now as then, are largely headed by Soviet citizens, with only
the recent amendments changing the requirement that the Soviet partner
own a majority interest in the firm. In addition, clauses on labor policy
in both situations require Soviet legislation to apply. Finally, and most
dramatically, though administrative confiscation was expressly prohib-
ited by the state in the 1920s, the same result of termination could be
reached by forced liquidation if the concession failed to abide by its pro-
duction schedule. Currently, the same result is assured by the Council of
Minister's right to end the joint venture should the firm not follow the
131 See supra note 44 and 116 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 50-51 and 108 and accompanying text.
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goals laid out in the state charter. The state has never conceded its ulti-
mate power of review.
However, the differences between the Law of Concessions and the
1980s guidelines seem much more significant than their similarities. The
most prominent difference between the two periods is the place of direct
investment in Soviet law. Under the concession agreements, contracts
had the character of legislation and were exempt from the general legal
order. In effect, the concession operated outside the general economic
system, though often subservient to it. The present legislation is part of
an overall restructuring of the Soviet economic system and therefore op-
erates within a new socialist legal order. This total restructuring seems
to entail a sense of permanence that the earlier arrangements lacked.
Furthermore, where each concession contract had varying terms, the
present proposed legislation includes uniform standards and will lend co-
herency the earlier situation did not have. All investors will now theoret-
ically be subject to the same rules. This new policy does not seem to be a
gap-filling one.
While the new amendments to the joint venture decree have created
some degree of change, they still differ fundamentally from the varying
provisions of the concession contracts. The amendments will be uni-
formly applied to all joint ventures in the USSR or, in the case of certain
tax incentives, to all enterprises in a particular region. However, it re-
mains unclear whether joint ventures formed prior to the amendments
will continue to be subject to the earlier provisions of the decree.' 33 The
Soviet authorities are not creating many rules to respond to the needs of
particular firms as they appeared to do in the 1920s, but rather are
changing the rules to meet the demands of their economy as a whole.
While the amendments do sacrifice a degree of uniformity, the Soviets
are still legislating prospectively.
Other differences perhaps reflect a better Soviet understanding of
market economic principles. The Soviets now encourage joint ventures
to be profit maximizers. While concession contracts imposed an increas-
ingly stringent tax on greater-than-expected profits, the new decree does
not hinder profits with restrictive tax provisions-providing a uniform
rate for all profits (except for profits generated in regions, like the Soviet
Far East, slated for expedited economic development). 134
In addition, the Soviet government protects the foreign partner's in-
vestment by returning its contribution for the residual value at liquida-
tion, instead of merely confiscating all buildings and fixtures when a
133 See supra notes 61-62 and 130 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 50-52 and 120-21 and accompanying text.
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concession ends. This acknowledges that joint production is not simply
joint exploitation of an industrial opportunity whose effects end when the
concession terminates. Rather, joint production leaves behind infrastruc-
ture or technology which will continue to benefit the Soviet economy
even after the foreign partner leaves. 135 Thus, since foreign resources
have continuing beneficial effects, these should be compensated. Lastly,
some elements of inflexibility have been removed in the new law. Both a
pre-arranged production schedule and a hard currency importation re-
quirement are no longer required. This reflects better Soviet understand-
ing of supply and demand pressures and the need to give concessionaires
some financial independence.
The role of the joint venture amendments represents the different
relative strengths of the competing themes within the concession decree
and the present guidelines. Under the rules of the 1920s, control over the
direction of the economy seemed more important to Soviet economic
planners than attraction of foreign capital. This was most clearly ex-
pressed in the provision taxing excess profits strictly, which would allow
Soviet authorities to regulate their internal price structure. 136 Presently,
the continued liberalization of foreign investment rules indicates that the
theme of attracting hard currency is strengthened. This may be ex-
plained by the fact that the present decree is but one portion of an over-
riding restructuring of Soviet economic and social life. The entire Soviet
system is presently involved, while formerly the concession contracts
were the exception to the established legislation and as such they at-
tempted to comply with the existing structure without constantly coming
into conflict with it. In short, the current joint venture amendments rep-
resent, on a small scale, the revolutionary changes occurring within the
Soviet economy as a whole.
The same themes run through both eras with the same intended
goals-providing enough firm independence to lure foreign investment,
while assuring Soviet control over the enterprise with effective integra-
tion of it into the centralized Soviet economy. Today, however, the for-
eign partner has all the benefits previously given, combined with new
elements of flexibility in the present edict and its amendments. Over a
period of approximately sixty-five years, the USSR has become increas-
ingly, yet cautiously, pragmatic.
135 See supra notes 43-44 and 101-102 and accompanying text.
136 See I. BERNsITEIN, supra note 27; FOREIGN TRADE, supra note 80, at 17. The recent amend-
ments to the joint venture decree have liberalized customs matters to an even greater degree. Prod-
ucts brought into the Soviet Union for the production needs of the joint venture enterprise will either
receive custom-free duty treatment or have their duties eased. XVII Bus. E. EUROPE, Dec. 19,
1988, at 403.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Initial response to the opportunity presented has been favorable. At
the end of November 1988, 139 joint ventures had been registered with
another 500 reported to be under negotiation. 137 The first United States
industrial stake in the USSR, undertaken by Combustion Engineering
Incorporated, has already been implemented. 138 Other United States
companies-including Pepsico, Occidental Petroleum, Monsanto,
SSMC, Honeywell, Dresser Industries, and Cummins Engine-are pres-
ently in the negotiations stage.139 Additionally, Eastman Kodak, RIR
Nabisco, Ford Motors, Archer Daniels Midland, Johnson & Johnson,
Chevron, and the Mercator Corporation have formed the American
Trade Consortium to strengthen the firms' negotiating positions.140
However, creativity in adapting the Soviet provisions to Western needs
seems to be the key to a successful agreement. For example, Combustion
Engineering, which is to upgrade Soviet industrial plants, will receive
payments mostly in gasoline and diesel fuel. This serves as an easy way
to get dollar profits back home while avoiding the tax on hard currency
profits taken abroad and escaping the Soviet conversion fee.14 1 This op-
tion is available since gasoline itself is highly convertible (a fungible
good) and can be sold on the world market once outside the Soviet Union
for hard currency.
As it did in the 1920s, the Soviet Union is struggling today to bal-
ance the need to attract Western investors with the need to maintain
control over its planned economy. However, while there are still formi-
dable barriers to investment in the USSR, the Soviets are being prag-
matic. They have developed a system that is acceptable to them and
which may be acceptable to those in the West who can understand what
is expected from them and who can learn to operate under its terms.
The prospects for success may ultimately rely on the politics of eco-
nomic reform within the Soviet Union. Should the reforms meet resist-
ance from the industrial bureaucracy, joint ventures may be adversely
affected. 142 However, since the concept of joint ventures seems much
more deeply ingrained in Soviet law today than it was in the 1920s, it is
137 XVII BUS. E. EUR., Jan. 2, 1989, at 4.
138 The Twain are Meeting-and Cutting Deals, Bus. WEEK Dec. 7, 1987, at 88. However, the
company has had difficulty in obtaining an adequate building for its headquarters. Joint Misadven-
tures, TIME, Apr. 10, 1989, at 84.
139 Id.
140 XVII Bus. E. EUR., May 9, 1988, at 150.
141 Id.




much more probable that Western investors will find Soviet joint ven-
tures beneficial.
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